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Curing the Criminal. By Jesse 0. Stutsman. New York, The Mae-
Millan Co., 1926. pp. viii, 419.
Can there be any such thing as "punishment" for a "crime"? Is punish-
ment a measurable thing? Something that we can put a certain amount
of into a scale pan to balance a given crime? Such is certainly the bibli-
cal interpretation. Do our courts and lawmakers hold this view? I would
have said not if I had not had the opportunity a few years ago to discuss
the question of punishment with a supreme court judge. I got then my
first intimation that our theory of punishment is still based upon the Old
Testament and is a part of every Christian's creed. Certainly many of
our jurists belong back in the age where torture was a fine art. Christian
society still expects an eye for an eye.
To thinking men this point of view is ununderstandable. Psychology
believes today that man is made-only formless protoplasm is born. Man
can do only what he is taught to do by adults and playmates and he can
be taught this only within the limitations of the physical set-up surround-
ing him during his plastic years. Hence whatever the outcome man as an
individual is not responsible. His social and physical matrix is respons-
ible. If he deviates either he is sick and needs psychiatric and other medi-
cal attention, or else he has not received the kind of training necessary
for him to act in accordance with group standards (which vary from year
to year, community to community, and from nation to nation). Changing
him is always an experimental individual problem. To change him one
needs to know the technique of reconditioning. The deviant from our
standard social behavior should, from the psychologist's standpoint, be-
come a laboratory subject.
The progress that this general point of view has made in penology has
been sketched by Mr. Jesse 0. Stutsman, in "Curing the Criminal." The
author is in no sense a psychologist or psychopathologist. His presenta-
tion shows that he is not a scientific man. His long practical experience
in prison work (now general superintendent of Rockview Penitentiary)
and his faith in research work in this field, however, make us forgive
him for a very loosely knit volume. The fair chapters in the book are,
Penology and the Dawning Science; The New Profession, in which he
justly scores political appointments in prisons; Prisons Without Walls,
where he shows that such are possible and desirable; Prison Industries
and Compensation of Prisoners, where the sound argument is advanced
that occupation should be taught and the excellent but by no means new ap-
peal is also presented for compensation for prisoner and dependent fa-
mily; The Police as a Deterrent Agency, in which he tells us much about
bribery, strawbondsmen, etc., things we all know about but do nothing
about; The Death Penalty, which he says will soon pass since it does not
act as a deterrent of crime.
Mr. Stutsman argues valiantly for-and this is his "cure"--individual
treatment, the indeterminate sentence in prisons without walls, for decent
education along general and vocational lines, for parole at the proper
time as a step in the gradual and unconditional return to society.
He is unfortunately an enthusiastic formal Christian and a moralist.
This considerably disturbs the scientific reader. A warden when on duty
has no business being either a Christian or a moralist. He is or should
be a specialist with no bias of his own. He should work with an eye
solely upon the outcome of the retraining and reconditioning of the sub-




The Doctrine of Cont, uozs Voyagc. By Herbert Whittal:er Briggs.
Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1926. pp. 224.
This is a very meritorious study of the origin and development of a
rule of international law which in the treatises is generally dezeribed as
the "doctrine of continuous voyage," but which might more appropriately
be called the rule of ultimate destination. Aside from a few articles in
the journals of international law there have been no cpecial contributions
to the literature of what has come to be an important rule or doctrine of
the law of war. The present study, therefore, will be welcomed by stu-
dents for the light which it throws upon a somewhat neglected chapter in
the general history of international law.
The author reviews in turn the origin of the doctrine of continuous
voyage in the so called "rule of war of 1756," its application by the
British to blockade and the carriage of contraband before and during the
Napoleonic wars, the interpretations which Sir William Scott placed upon
it, and the more recent applications and extensions which it received dur-
ing the Crimean war, the -American Civil War, the war of 1896 between
Italy and Abyssinia, the Boer War and especially the World War.
There is also a summary of the discussions of the subject at the London
Naval Conference.
Naturally, the major part of Dr. Briggs's study is devoted to a dis-
cussion of the extensions of the doctrine during the World War: its
application to the carriage of conditional contraband, involving as it did
the abolition of the distinction between absolute and conditional contra-
band; its extension to blockade operations; the invention of new prCsump-
tions of hostile destination, and the drawing of inferences of quiet from
various circumstances; the shifting of the burden of proof from the cap-
tor to the claimant; the abuse of the right of reprisal; the talking of
neutral vessels into British ports for e-xamination of their cargoes; the
abolition by Great Britain of the formality of the first hearing in the
procedure of the prize court; the admission of extrinsic evidence for the
purpose of condemnation; the narrow interpretation of the "common
stock" doctrine, etc.
The author's analysis of the decisions and the practice during the World
War is, on the whole, scientiffic and judicial in spirit although he makes
no attempt to conceal his own view that the extensions and the interpreta-
tions, especially of the British prize courts, reprezented an unwarranted
encroachment upon the rights of neutrals as they were defined by what he
considers to have been at the time the established principles of interna-
tional law. Writers, however, are not lacking who will not concur in his
assumption that certain rules, which Great Britain was charged with hav-
ing violated were really "established" principles of international law. Thus
he apparently assumes that the old rule which required a ship to be con-
demned "out of her own mouth" and which excluded the admission of ex-
trinsic evidence in the trial was a generally recognized rule of prize law.
It was undeniably an established rule of British and American prize proce-
dure but it is not easy to see why Great Britain did not have the right
to alter it when changed conditions rendered the old rule absurd. Simi-
larly, he appears to regard the British practice of taking vezZels into a
home port for examination of their cargoes as being contrary to an es-
tablished rule of international law. But the fact is, this practice had
been sometimes followed in former wars, notably during the American
Civil War and during the Balkan wars and it is the opinion of most naval
commanders (among them, the late Admiral Stoc!ton) that under modern
conditions search if permitted to be made only at sea would often prove
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wholly ineffective. During the World War all the maritime belligerents
resorted to the practice of taking their prizes in for examination, and it
is certain to be followed in the wars of the future unless the necessity for
it is removed by a system of certification as has been proposed. Dr.
Briggs's criticism of the Anglo-French measures against German com-
merce as a "so-called blockade" follows the lines of the American protest,
while the United States was neutral. Here again it may be confidently
asserted that in the wars of the future when one of the belligerents is
circumstanced as Germany was, favored by the proximity of neutral ports
through which a stream of supplies from over the seas can pour into its
territory, the right of blockade will be employed by the enemy to prevent
it. Unless this is done the right of blockade will be illusory except when
applied against insular states. It is certain that Germany would, had
it been within her power, have adopted similar measures against the com-
merce of her enemies and it is hardly necessary to remark that when
the United States became a belligerent during the late war she co-operated
with Great Britain and France in enforcing the new blockade which as
a neutral she had denounced as illegal. Dr. Briggs criticizes some of the
presumptions of hostile destination which were invented by the British
government and by the prize courts and the inferences of guilt which were
drawn by the prize courts from various circumstances and transactions-
and the criticism is not entirely unjustified-yet it is hard to see why
in many cases the general principle was not sound. Take, for example,
the reliance upon so-called "statistical" evidence where the pre-war im-
portations of over-seas commodities into some of the neutral countries ad-
jacent to Germany were practically nil but which during the years of the
war soared to millions of pounds. They were often consigned to "order"
or to "dummy" consignees or to agents of enemy governments, who flocked
in large numbers to neutral ports, opened offices, sometimes in hotels, and
in a few months were receiving enormous consignments of commodities
for which Germany was in dire need. For the prize court to have closed
its eyes to these realities, to have refused to draw inferences therefrom
and to have presumed an innocence on the part of those engaged in such
traffic and to have required captors to prove guilt may be a necessary
principle of procedure in a criminal trial, but it is too much to
expect that it will be followed by a prize court under the conditions which
prevailed during the World War. The reviewer entirely agrees with Dr.
Briggs that the right of belligerents to intercept the carriage of contra-
band to the enemy and to prevent by blockade all over-sea trade with him
is a "qualified" right; at the same time it is a fundamental and incon-
testible right which may be reasonably extended and adapted to meet new
and evet changing conditions, otherwise the right may be worthless as it
certainly would have been during the War if the technical rules of the
old practice had been strictly adhered to. The conclusion of the author is
that the real problem raised by the doctrine of continuous voyage is
whether it can continue to exist "without gravely imperilling international
maritime law." Neutrals, he thinks, have international law on their side.
He is perhaps right in concluding that there appears to be no solution of
the problem short of a rule forbidding neutrals to trade at all with any
belligerent.
As stated in the beginning of this review, Dr. Briggs's monograph is a
useful and interesting contribution and its intrinsic value is not lessened
by a few relatively unimportant errors and infelicitous expressions. To
mention several of them, he speaks (p. 112) of the German prize code
having been amended by a Reichsgesetzblatt; he frequently uses the ex-
pression "first leg of the voyage" when "lap" would be better; on page 148
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he speaks of the German prize court having upheld the "'validity" of an
article of the prize code, as if it were competent to do otherwise, etc. In
his bibliography one notes the absence of some important books such as
Bentwich's and Cohen's works on the Declaration of London, Parmelco's
Blockade and Sea Power and especially Virzijl's monumental Droit dc.s
Prises de la Grande Guerre which contains a comprehensive analysis of
the jurisprudence of the prize courts during the World War, relative to
the doctrine of continuous voyage. IJAzms W. G ,=m
Profits, Dividends and the Law. By Prosper Reiter, Jr. New York, The
Ronald Press Co., 1926. pp. -d, 260.
The preface of this book states "it is the author's hope that this book
will stimulate further thought in the field of legal accountancy, enable
lawyers to appreciate the accounting principles involved in arriving at
the profit available for dividends, and serve as a ready reference to law-
yers, business men and accountants where legal authority is needed."
There is substantial reason to think that the author's hope will be
realized. The book is a stimulating and interesting book in a field where
there has been no first rate American book of accountancy, and it is in its
clear statement of accounting principles that its chief merit lies. There
is undoubtedly a wide divergence between the accountant's sharply defined
conception of profits and dividends and the rather muddy conceptions of
the courts on the same topic, and this presentation of the accountant's con-
ception may therefore be of real value in the working out of the law.
The book is far less successful in stating the legal side of the muddle
than it is in stating the accountant's side, and the author has not "suffered"
with his law in the same complete way that he has come to kmow his
accountancy. While his analysis of the impairment of capital cases is
satisfactory, he has not given adequate attention to recent federal income
tax cases which have gone far to establish a basis on which the law of
what is profit may be worked out. His treatment of the doctrine of Ba,-
sett v. United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foz.zdiy Co.,' is far from adequate;
he does not cite the important later cases and the literature on the topic-
e.g. the Day 2 and Morax3 cases in the same Court; Collins -v. Portland Elee.
tric Power Co.,4 recently affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals,5 and
the unreported Norwich Power v. Southoni Railway case decided in Vir-
ginia in 1925 on the same topic, nor the recent legal articles in regard to
it by Mr. Berle and others.0 His treatment of the subject suffers markedly
from that lack of knowledge of these authorities. Nor does the book deal
at all with the questions which arise in law or accountancy where, as is
most common, corporate business is conducted through controlled or partly-
owned subsidiaries and it becomes necessary to determine rights inter ssc
between several classes of shareholders for various accounting periods.
The law which the book expounds is too far the not-thought-out law of
the compiled text books-the author has not got close enough to the legal
problems completely to understand them or to be sympathetic with them-
174 N. J. Eq. 668, 70 AtI. 929 (1908).
2 Day v. United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., 9G N. J. Eq. 730,
126 Atl. 302 (1924).
3 Moran v. United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., 9G N. J. Eq.
698, 126 AtI. 329 (1924).
4 7 Fed. (2d) 221 (D. C. Or. 1925).
5 12 Fed. (2d) 671 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920).
6 See Berle, Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock (192-3) 23 Cor. L. Rtv.
358; id., Participating Preferred Stock (1926) 20 ibid. 003, and citations.
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but nevertheless the book is interesting and stimulating and a real step
in a much needed formulation of law on the topic which can hardly be
done without the background of accountancy.
JosEPH P. COTTON
Growth of Legal Aid Work in the United States. By Reginald H. Smith
and John S. Bradway. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1926.
pp. v, 145. -
It is improbable that even the imprimatur of the Government Printing
Office can wholly obscure the inherent distinction or conceal the importance
of this admirable little book. Its distinction is recognized by a former
president of the United States, the present Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, who has written a discriminating preface. The importance of the
subject presented and the excellent workmanship exhibited in its treatment
deserve a more honored binding, an energetic distributor and a price that
proclaims the value of the work.
The theme is thus strikingly stated, "In recent years much has been
written concerning the law and its effect on the collective interests of wage
earners; there is a voluminous literature on the law of labor unions, col-
lective bargaining, strikes, picketing, closed shop, injunctions; but little
space and attention have been devoted to the law as it affects the indi-
vidual claims and the individual rights of the wage earner and of his fa-
mily in their everyday life. . . . However vital and important the
larger topics may be, there have been moments in the lives of thousands
of men when the collection of their overdue wages was the most im-
portant thing in the world, because it meant the difference between food
and hunger, and there have been similar moments in the lives of count-
lbss women when the collection of compensation for a husband's injury or
death meant the difference between independence and destitution."
The succeeding pages show how far we have failed to make good our
American boast, incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution, that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. It is true that in all our states, courts
have been established to do justice between disputants, but they are not
really open to the poor litigant. At the very outstart he is barred by the
requirement of security for costs, which he cannot give. Even in those
states, numbering somewhat more than half of all, which have in forma
pauperis laws, the provisions made for the relief of the impecunious com-
plainant are inadequate. But even if he is able to raise the money for
costs and fees, he is helpless without the advice and aid of a lawyer, whose
charges, even when reasonable from the standpoint of time consumed,
must often absorb the whole of the petty claim. Then follow the vexations
and wasteful delays incident to formal court procedure which cost the poor
man time and money and sometimes his job as well. Certainly for the
poor the delay of justice is the denial of justice. The authors show clearly
that with regard to costs, attorneys' fees and delays, we have much to
learn from the more advanced methods made use of in other lands.
Then follows quite the best and most comprehensive description any-
where to be found of the numerous remedial agencies employed in the
several states to better the evil conditions so clearly disclosed. These
agencies are listed in this order: small claims courts, conciliation tribunals,
industrial accident commissions, administrative officials (such as commis-
sioners of banking and of labor), the public defender and legal aid or-
ganizations. The work of the author of Justice and the Poor, a book
well on the way to become a classic, is easily'recognized in the admirable
account of the origin and development of the now wide-spread practice of
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providing a public defender for poor persons accused of crime, and of
legal aid organizations, now efficiently co-ordinated through a national
association with the prospect of soon effecting, through the ministration
of the League of Nations, connections with similar agencies in many for-
eign countries. Mr. Bradway's hand is seen in the numerous and detailed
statistical tables, both in the text and in the appendices, which add greatly
to the value of the work and to the cogency of its argument. It is to be
regretted, however, that the authors did not include in their account of
conciliation courts in this country the story of the unsuccezsful efforts
made about the middle of the last century to establish such courts in New
York, Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana, Ohio and North Dakota, which was
so dramatically told by Chief Justice Winslow in an address before the
Wisconsin Bar Association in 1914.
To the increasing number of persons who are coming to appreciate the
social need of extending to the poor and unfortunate the equal protection
of the law, this little book will provide invaluable information both as to
procedure and technique.
W. R. VANc.
Cases on Federal Tazation. By Joseph Henry Beale and Roswell MIagill.
New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1926. pp. xv, 719.
The purpose of this case book, as stated in the preface, is "to collect,
particularly for the use of students of law and business, materials for the
study of the interpretation and administration of the more important fed-
eral tax laws." With this in mind, chapter I is devoted to the Constitu-
tional Aspects of the Taxation of Income, chapter H to Classes of Tax-
payers, chapter III to the Tax on Individuals, chapter IV to the Tax on
Corporations, chapter V to the Tax on Estates and Trusts and chapter VI
to Administrative Provisions. In Part II is discussed the Estate Tax, in
Part III the Gift Tax and in Part IV the Capital Stock Tax. As spade
with which to dig into the ground, the cases are well chosen, and under
the skilful guidance of a teacher thoroughly informed concerning the de-
velopment of the law as well as the more recent decisions, this book will
be very valuable.
The truth is, however, that even with such able and well informed men
as the two compilers of this book, they cannot satisfy or be expected to
satisfy the needs of the practicing lawyer. It is hopeless even for the
specialist in tax matters to keep abreast of the decisions. For example,
in discussing the gift tax, how could the authors have referred to Mci Tcir
v. Anderson,' in which Judge Augustus N. Hand passed on the constitu-
tionality of the gift tax law, when it was only decided on February 16,
1926? Again, there is no reference to Professor Magill's able article in
the YLu LAw JOURNAL, 2 Tax Exremption of State Employec. Obviously-
not; it did not appear until June, 1926. But no practicing lawyer will
have completed his search and study of the subject of the applicability of
tax law to state instrumentalities if he has failed to read it. F7cy v.
Woodworth3 went to the United States Supreme Court but -was dismissed
on appeal on the motion of the Solicitor General.4  The reviewer sbame-
facedly acknowledges that though he had been watching this appeal
closely, he did not know of the dismissal of the appeal until it was dis-
closed in the footnote on page 967 of Professor Magill's article. The stu-
'.2 Fed. (2d) 813 (S. D. N. Y. 1926).
2 (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 956.
3 2 Fed. (2d) 725 (E. D. Mich. 1924).
4A6 Sup. Ct. 347 (1926).
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dent should use his fountain pen and on page 289 of the book insert a
reference to this article, noting especially the footnote reference on page
956, note 3. He should also note a cross reference to and carefully study
Metcalf v. Mitchell.5
The rapidity with which decisions are being made in this field of the law
leads to the somewhat pessimistic conclusion that it is wholly impracticable
to compile a text or case book on this subject which will not be out of date
before the book can be proofread and bound. In this connection it may be
noted (p. 523) that the case of Girard Trust Co. v. McCaughn,0 involving
the question of the taxability in the estate of a settler of the corpus of a
trust where he has reserved the income to himself for life, was reversed
by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on February 23rd,
1926. Its reasoning was expressly repudiated by District Judge Westen-
haver in Cleveland Trust Co. v. Routzahn7 On the other hand, as re-
cently as June 1, 1926, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, in the case of Frew v. Bowers,8 reached the same result as did
Judge Dickinson in the District Court in the McCaughn case.
What a difficult thing it is these days to write any authoritative kind
of a law book in almost any field of the law! Someone should devise a
mechanical contrivance which will permit inserts to be made as freely as
McKinney's supplements to the annotated statutes of New York are In-
serted in the main volumes.
The book discloses conscientious effort to bring within the realm of stu-
dent work material which will enable the student to come to grips with
the leading questions of federal tax law. Read from that point of view,
the book is an admirable piece of workmanship. Taken, however, from the
angle of the active practitioner, daily face to face with tax problems upon
which he must advise, it facilitates research but is not conclusive. Our
advice to the student is to dig and dig, omitting no instructor's notes or
suggestions, using his fountain pen freely, if he wishes to keep this
book later on for use in his practice. He should regard the book as a
challenge to him to find the most recent decision on any branch of the
subject under discussion in the classroom, and if he follows this advice
he may have the supreme satisfaction of startling his professor with a
reference to a decision with which the professor himself is not yet fa-
miliar. In the reviewer's classroom days this was no mean triumph for a
student.
JULIUs HENRY COHEN
The Negotiable Instruments Law Annotated. By Joseph Doddridge Bran-
nan. Fourth Edition, by Zechariah Chaffee, Jr. Cincinnati, The W. H.
Anderson Co., 1926. pp. cxlviii, 1041.
'The new edition of Brannan is an excellent work. What may be re-
garded as its prime object is the collection of cases decided under the act,
and this appears to have been thoroughly accomplished. For the most
part, the comment on cases is good. From a technical standpoint, the
cases are well arranged and well stated, while the new marginal ref-
erences enable the reader to come quickly to the decisions on the point
under consideration. Superior as a whole to its earlier editions, this work
finds place in the small row of books which both teacher and practitioner
in the commercial law field must keep close at hand for constant use.
546 Sup. Ct. 172 (1926).6 3 Fed. (2d) 618 (E. D. Pa. 1925).
77 Fed. (2d) 483, at 485 (N. D. Ohio, 1925).
8 12 Fed (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
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As a handbook, the omission of the full text of the extensive Ames-
Brewster-McKeehan discussion is an unmixed blessing. The decisions on
the points raised, or in many eases the lack of such decisions, during the
past 25 years, suffice for most purposes. Indeed, now that the act has
been adopted in all the states substantially as drafted, the search for dis-
crepancies, however well intentioned in the beginning, should end in favor
of an endeavor to point the way to a uniform enlightened interpretation.
And there is no doubt that in this regard the present edition should be
of even more help than the last on many points. At the same time there
are some contentions urged which are of doubtful value. For example, it
is difficult to see what purpose is served by asserting positively again, and
with no authority, that section 40 is in conflict with section 9 (5) and
should be repealed.i Section 9 (5) reads that an instrument is payable
to bearer when the "only or last indorsement is in blank." When a spe-
cial indorsement follows a blank indorsement, neither the only nor the
last indorsement is in blank, and the instrument is not payable to bearer
within the provisions of the act defining bearer paper. That being the
case, section 40, providing that bearer paper may be negotiated by delivery
although specially indorsed, applies only to instruments originally payable
to bearer, as suggested by Mr. DIcKeehan.2  As to the policy of making
this distinction between bearer and order paper, regardless of how it
may have come about, that is a point on which further evidence should
be taken before any change is made. Looked at from the standpoint of
the business community as a whole, rather than that of a particular
holder, it may well be desirable to continue to have one type of instrument
which approaches money in negotiability by remaining negotiable by de-
livery alone although specially indorsed.
The cases representing the two views on the question whether a payee
may be a holder in due course under the act are well presented.3 The dif-
ficulty appears to be purely one of construction. No adequate reason of
policy seems to have been advanced by anyone to show that a payee tak-
ing in good faith and for value should not be entitled to the same pro-
tection that would be accorded any subsequent holder. And, from the
payee's standpoint, no convincing reason appears for distinguishing be-
tween the situation where the person delivering the paper to him was a
thief in the position of remitter and that where the delivery vas by an
agent acting contrary to authority. Such being the case, it is desirable to
clear up the question by amendment. The amendment proposed by Mr.
Chaffee4 does not seem satisfactory. There are many points to be con-
sidered for which space is not now available. The proposed amendment,
however, would add to section 52 (the section defining holder in due courze)
a provision that to be such a holder one must have had no notice "that
the delivery to himself was wrongful." Wh9nile the use of both "negotiat-
ing" and "delivery" in the section would seem to make it clear that a
payee might be a holder in due course, does the amendment accomplish
its purpose and no more? In section 14 the phrase "negotiated to a
holder in due course" is used, and it is quite conceivable that a court in
construing this with the amended section 52 would decide that two types
of holders in due course were provided for: those to whom the paper has
been negotiated and those to whom it has been delivered. As the payee
could well fall in the latter class it might still be held that he was not a
holder in due course within section 14. This would be covered, no doubt,
I p. 294.
2 p. 325.
3 pp. 361 to 374.
4 pp. vii and 361.
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by amending section 14 to follow the language of section 16 in the similar
situation.
The proposed amendment would also go too far. It applies not only
in cases of payees, but of subsequent holders as well. A holder, to be
entitled to the rights of a holder in due course, would need to show not
only that the requirements of the present section 52 had been met, but
in addition that he had no notice of a "wrongful" "delivery." Perhaps
this would all be construed not to increase the requirements of the present
section. But surely it is unwise to risk conflicting interpretations. And
what is meant by "wrongful" in this connection? It would seem that
all points could be covered directly by amending only the latter part of
section 30, the section defining negotiation, to read somewhat as follows:
if payable to order it is negotiated to the payee by delivery or to a subse-
quent party by the indorsement of the holder completed by the delivery.
There is obvious danger involved in tinkering with a statute. We have
had too much suggestion of amendment without enough emphasis on
whether change is necessary. In any case, when change is shown to be
desirable, the principle of uniformity should not be wholly ignored, al-
though it may never be fully realized. Some twenty-five years hence, it
may be well to undertake a comprehensive revision of the act, after
thorough discussion, and with the approval and support of the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws. In the meantime, in making minor
amendments, it would be desirable when possible to follow the same pro-
cedure.5
There are many other points which might be discussed with profit.
There is much to be said both from the standpoint of the lender and that
of the borrower in favor of an amendment specifically authorizing addi-
tional acceleration provisions. It seems possible that some of the sup-
posed difficulty with regard to section 28 may be occasioned by a strained
interpretation of the section as one relating to burden of proof.0 The
much discussed position of a drawee who has certified a check altered as
to payee is still uncertain.7 The approval as a matter of policy given the
Illinois case8 denying recovery to the drawee, seems to lose sight of the
fact that this interpretation of section 62 would apply generally and that
all drawees are not large city banks.in position to insure. Further, the
taker from the alterer in many cases will have acted for a prospective
profit and there is no good reason why he should keep his profit at the
expense of the drawee. Also in many cases the taker may have had
misgivings, not amounting to bad faith, concerning the regularity of the
transaction, and could therefore perhaps best be charged with detecting
the alteration.
There is frequent reference to the law reviews. The articles should
prove of value, representing, as they do, the result of much labor from an
unbiased viewpoint. It is a pleasure also to note in the preface to this
edition that the act is conceded "to have made great advances upon the
common law." Too little credit has been given to the draftsman, Mr.
Crawford. With all of its shortcomings, real and imaginary, the act ha
proven to be a rather satisfactory piece of legislation. RoscoE TUNER
5 In 1922 proposed amendments of sections 32 and 38 of the Uniform
Sales Act were approved and recommended for enactment by the Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. WVILISTON, SALES (2d
ed. 1924) 1779.
6 See (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 369.7 pp. 570 to 572.
8 National City Bank v. Bank of the Republic, 300 Ill. 103, 132 N. E.
832 (1922).9 p. vii.
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Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Federal Courts. By John C. Rose.
Third Edition. Albany, Matthew Bender & Co., 1926. pp. ,_%%iv, 919.
This is a new edition of Judge Rose's well known book on federal proce-
dure. Earlier editions appeared in 1915 and 1922, and were favorably re-
ceived. (See reviews by Professors Sunderland and Dobie in (1923) 21
MICH. L. REv. 617, and (1923) 9 VA. L. REv. 476, respectively; also (1915)
13 MICH. L. REv. 715; (1915) 15 CoL. L. REv. 644; (1915) 63 U. or P.
L. Rnv. 583; (1923) 8 IA. L. BULL. 287). The work grew out of the au-
thor's lectures on the subject at the University of Maryland, prepared
while he was United States District Judge for the District of Maryland;
he is now Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit, and with a long ex-
perience of the practice of which he writes. His book has been dis-
tinguished for its brevity and conciseness and at the same time its clarity.
The lecture style seems somewhat apparent; not many cases are cited,
and when given are usually stated at some length as illustrative ma-
terial.
Little need be added concerning the new edition, for it follows the gen-
eral plan of the earlier editions. The occasion for it is stated to be the
new federal acts and Supreme Court decisions and especially the Act of
February 13, 1925. The method of preparing the new edition is that
followed by most law writers, namely the incorporation of the former
edition without variation except wvhere absolutely necessary because of
change of statute or judicial rule, and the addition here and there of new
matter in text or notes. No considerable revision is attempted. One new
chapter is added; chapter XVIII, "Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements,"
dealing with the new Federal Arbitration Act. The actual text still rcmains
of fairly brief compass, considering the large type used. It comprizes
609 pages. The remaining part of the book, amounting to over one-third,
consists of reprints of the original Judiciary Act, the Judicial Code, the
Equity rules, and the usual tables of contents and of cases and the
index.
The book is designed for the busy lawyer or the student who desires
a summary statement. No attempt is made at discussion and solution of
knotty questions. The law review articles are ignored. Certain pleading
and procedure ideas, current among federal practitioners, which, it is to be
hoped, vill soon be exploded, such as that the Constitution requires a
separation of law and equity, are repeated without analysis or criticism.
In using the work, its somewhat limited purpose must be kept in mind.
That it seems to fulfill admirably.
C. E. C.
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